Indians." Unfortunately, this rule raises more questions than it answers. What constitutes "reservation lands" and "reservation Indians" is a decades-long debate between Indian peoples and state governments.
Joan This question of first impression in Wisconsin affected not only the eleven Indian Tribes within the state' and the thousands of Indians that live and work in Indian Country located in Wisconsin, it also set a precedent for future extension of state taxation in Indian Country. This article examines the Indian tax case law leading up to LaRock and the arguments presented by the taxpayer in that case. This article then analyzes the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding in LaRock, which has already proven to be a guidepost for subsequent Indian tax adjudication. Finally, this article discusses the implications of LaRock for Indian people, Indian reservations, and Indian identity.
L Procedural History
Joan LaRock resided on land that is part of the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin Reservation. 7 She worked at the Oneida Bingo and Casino, a business wholly owned and operated by the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin." The land upon which Ms. LaRock resided, as well as the land upon which the Casino is located, are titled to the United States of America and held in trust for the Oneida Tribe.
Ms. LaRock is an enrolled member of the Menominee Indian Tribe. She married an Oneida Indian, with whom she had four children. Joan LaRock's children are all enrolled members of the Oneida Tribe."
In 1996, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (DOR) sent notice to Joan LaRock that she owed $588.80 plus interest for income earned in 1994 and 1995."' Ms. LaRock appealed the DOR's finding to the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission. The Tax Appeals Commission entered a decision and order dated May 11, 1998, awarding summary judgement in favor of the DOR." The Tax Appeals Commission held that the State of Wisconsin may impose a tax on the income of Joan LaRock because she did not live on the Menominee Indian Reservation at the time she earned the income. "[Tihe absence of proper residency or the proper situs for income is fatal to an Indian seeking immunity from state income tax. We hold that nonmember status on a reservation is also disqualifying."' 2 On appeal to the Brown County District Court, Judge Zuidmulder upheld the findings of the Tax Appeals Commission in a decision and order dated February 11, 1999.'" Judge Zuidmulder held that because Joan LaRock is not an Oneida Indian, the State of Wisconsin may tax her income. "It follows that since Petitioner is not a member of the Oneida Nation [sic], she enjoys no protected status that would allow her to claim immunity from the duty she owes as a citizen of the State of Wisconsin to pay income taxes."" On December 28, 1999, a three-judge panel of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and order issued by Judge Zuidmulder. ' The court of appeals examined the treaties creating the Oneida Reservation and the congressional acts delineating the state's jurisdiction within Indian Country, and could not "conclude that the treaties or federal statutes preempt state tax jurisdiction here."'" On appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Joan LaRock argued that federal, not state, law determines an individual's status as an "Indian" and what constitutes "Indian Country;" that Congress never expressly granted the State of Wisconsin the power to tax Indians living on the Oneida Reservation; and consequently, the State of Wisconsin's taxation of her income is prohibited. Ms. LaRock argued that, although she is a not a member of the 9. Id The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed. In a decision authored by Justice Wilcox, the court upheld the decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals finding that "the State is not barred by principles of tribal sovereignty from taxing LaRock's income because, although she is an enrolled member of the Menominee Tribe, she is not an enrolled member of the Oneida Tribe.""'
II. Backdrop of Indian Sovereignty
In general, states do not have the power to tax Indian tribes or their members on activities within Indian Country.' 9 Congress can authorize state authority to tax Indian lands, but such authorization must be "unmistakably clear: ' In The Kansas Indians, for example, the Court ruled that lands held by Indians in common as well as those held in severalty were exempt from state taxation.... [In The New York Indians, the Court characterized the State's attempt to tax Indian reservation land as extraordinary, an "illegal" exercise of state power, and "an unwarrantable interference, inconsistent with the original title of the Indians, and offensive to their tribal relations." As the Government points out, this Court has never wavered from the views expressed in these cases. 2 The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged this principle, then applied it in a wholly unique way in the LaRock decision. The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that Congress has the power to open the doors of reservations to state laws because it derives its power from the "federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and treaty making." 23 From this basic tenet, the Wisconsin Supreme Court moved to the conclusion that it is the tribe, and not the tribal member, that enjoys a trust relationship with the federal government and that "the notion of the 'tribe,' grounded in our federal constitution, is the essential political unit in American Indian law." ' 4 The findings of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in LaRock are problematic for a number of reasons. First and foremost, there exists a trust relationship between the federal government and Indian peoples, not just Indian tribes. Congress historically applies its laws and statutes to all Indians, regardless of tribal membership. Under the Wheeler-Howard Act (commonly referred to as the Indian Reorganization Act), an "Indian" is defined as: "all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation ....
"
A "tribe" is defined as "any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation. 26 "For nearly two hundred years, the operative distinction for jurisdictional purposes in Indian country has been the distinction between Indians and nonIndians, not Indian members and nonmembers." 2 Congress repeatedly enunciates its plenary authority over Indians within Indian Country, regardless of tribal affiliation. Numerous federal statutes define "Indian" as being "any person who is a member of an Indian tribe." 2 
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Published While federal policy has always recognized Indian tribes as governmental entities, it has at the same time recognized Indians as individuals, different from other individuals, and to whom special rules apply. The particular tribe to which an individual Indian belongs has been of no consequence insofar as his status as an Indian vis-a-vis the federal government has been concerned. 43 In Topash, the United States took the position that the State of Minnesota's attempts to tax the income of an Indian living and working in Indian Country "ignores the whole tradition of Indian law, which gives special protection to Indians, of whatever tribe, residing on Indian reservations."" The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed.
Topash involved an enrolled Tulalip Indian living and working within the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota. This individual sought a refund of state taxes paid on the basis that, as an Indian, the state had no jurisdiction to tax income derived from Indian Country sources. '5 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that federal Indian jurisdiction includes Indians of all Tribes, and thus preempts the State of Minnesota's ability to tax an Indian living in Indian Country, regardless of tribal affiliation.' Ironically, a month before oral arguments were presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in LaRock, the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the Topash decision.
State v. R.M.H. addressed Minnesota's ability to enforce its speeding and driver's license laws against an Indian who committed offenses on a state highway located within the reservation of an Indian tribe of which he was not an enrolled member."' The nonmember Indian relied on Topash in arguing that the state's laws did not apply to him. In response, the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that its holding in Topash was no longer controlling:
Our conclusion in Topash that Indian jurisdiction includes Indians of all tribes conflicts with how the Supreme Court has defined Indian sovereignty in Oliphant and its progeny, which cases lead to a distinction between nonmember Indians and Indians who are The Wisconsin Supreme Court came to the same conclusion, reasoning that a taxpayer's status as an Indian is somehow dependent on residence. The Wisconsin Supreme Court even went so far as to note that "federal legislation over the past century has sought in some instances to encourage tribal coherence." ' 49 This holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in LaRock is insupportable in light of congressional law and policy regarding the treatment of Indians.
III. Residence in Indian Country
As noted above, a state is without power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians." The first question to be answered, therefore, is whether an Indian resides in a state for the purposes of income taxation. In Wisconsin, "residency" in a particular jurisdiction may serve as the basis for taxation.' Wisconsin may tax persons resident within its borders who do not live on reservations because it confers upon these persons the benefit of domicile and its accompanying privileges and advantages." However, an Indian's residence within Indian Country cannot serve as the basis for the imposition of Wisconsin income tax.
In the leading case on income tax immunity of Indians, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commissioner," the United States Supreme Court held that a Navajo Indian, residing on the Navajo Reservation, was not subject to state income tax for money earned on the reservation:
The residence of a tribal member is a significant component of the McClanahan presumption against state tax jurisdiction. But our cases make clear that a tribal member need not live on a formal reservation to be outside the State's taxing jurisdiction; it is enough that the member live in "Indian country."' If an Indian resides within Indian Country, the state has no jurisdiction to tax the income of the Indian. Indians that live within Indian Country do not "reside" in a state for income taxation purposes. The standard of review for a tax levied on an Indian tribe or an Indian residing in Indian Country is as follows: "Absent cession of jurisdiction or other Federal statutes permitting it, . . . a state is without power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians."" 5 The United States Supreme Court consistently differentiates between a state's jurisdiction over Indians living in Indian Country and those that reside outside Indian Country. In Chickasaw, the Supreme Court held that the State of Oklahoma could tax income earned in Indian Country by Indians living outside of Indian Country."' The key to this analysis was whether the Indians in question lived in Indian Country, not whether they lived in their own tribe's Indian Country. In Chickasaw, the residence of the taxpayer was the determinative factor used by the Supreme Court to decide if the state had taxing authority over the income of the Indians in question.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the importance of an Indian's residence in Oklahoma Tax Commissioner v. Sac & Fox Nation. 5 "To determine whether a tribal member is exempt from State income taxes under McClanahan, a court first must determine the residence of that tribal member.""sR The question presented in Sac & Fox was whether the State of Oklahoma-had the jurisdiction to tax employees of the Sac and Fox Nation." In its decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals drew a distinction between the taxation of tribal members and nonmembers. It found tribal members exempt from income taxation, regardless of residence." The Tenth Circuit further found that nonmembers of the Tribe, including nonmember Indians, were subject to state income taxation regardless of their residence. ' Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court could have simply affirmed the findings on appeal of the Tenth Circuit, the Court did not 54 In Anderson, however, we were referring to the specific reservation of the particular tribe in which Anderson was enrolled: the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of the Lake Superior Chippewa Indians. LaRock attempts to stretch this definition to include all Indian reservations, a proposition for which she provides no authority. Inasmuch as LaRock is not an enrolled member of the Oneida Tribe living on the Oneida Reservation, she is not a "reservation Indian" as that term is used in United States Supreme Court precedent or in our Anderson decision.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in LaRock does not comport with the presumption that as long as an Indian resides in Indian Country and derives her income from Indian Country, the state is presumed to have no taxation jurisdiction. 
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IV. Federal Preemption of State Taxation
In Indian Country, no activity is presumed taxable by the state. A state does not have the inherent ability to tax the income of an Indian living and working in Indian Country. Any extension of the state's jurisdiction into Indian Country must be at the express consent of Congress. 67 Consequently, applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read to determine if they allow state jurisdiction.
In 1948, Congress codified the concept of Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151. In order to qualify as Indian Country, the federal government must "set aside" the land in question for the exclusive use and occupancy of Indian peoples. 8 Indian Country may be reservation land, allotted reservation land, or land occupied by a dependent Indian community. 9 Indian Country is not dependent on the presence of a governing tribe.
It is in the creation and oversight of Indian Country that the federal government preempts the state's ability to tax Indian tribes and individuals. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Venetie, "the federal set-aside requirement also reflects the fact that because Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs, see U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, some explicit action by
As the Supreme Court held in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker:
Respondents' argument is reduced to a claim that they may assess taxes on nonIndians engaged in commerce on the reservation whenever there is no express congressional statement to the contrary. This is simply not the law. In a number of cases we have held that state authority over non-Indians acting on tribal reservations is pre-empted even though Congress has offered no explicit statement on the subject. Congress or the Executive must act to create Indian Country. When it does so, the exercise of jurisdiction and the encroachment of law is preempted:
The federal set-aside requirement ensures that the land in question is occupied by an "Indian community"; the federal superintendence requirement guarantees that the Indian community is sufficiently "dependent" on the Federal Government that the Federal Government and the Indians involved, rather than the States, are to exercise primary jurisdiction over the land in question. 7 '
The treaties or congressional acts establishing a reservation preclude the extension of state income tax law to any Indians on that reservation. "Implicit in these treaty terms, as it was in the treaties with the Cherokees involved in Worcester v. Georgia, was the understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed." ' In McClanahan, the United States Supreme Court, while noting that the Navajo Reservation was set aside for the occupancy and use of the Navajos, held that state tax law did not extend to Indians on the Navajo Reservation. 73 The Supreme Court did not distinguish between Navajos and other Indians residing on the Navajo Reservation.
Only Congress or action by the President of the United States may modify the tenure of the Indians on a reservation. A state's attempt to levy a tax based solely upon an Indian's residence within Indian Country, its core purpose being to provide a refuge from state authority and a "home" for Indians, is illogical, unjust, and violative of the rights guaranteed Indians by the United States pursuant to its treaty making authority.
V. A State Has No Inherent Jurisdictional Authority Over Nonmember Indians
The ability to determine and define a state's jurisdiction over Indians within Indian Country is left solely to the federal government. Congress has 70. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 531 n.6. 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002 exercised this plenary power over Indian affairs by specifically rejecting the contention that a state has inherent jurisdiction over nonmember Indians within Indian Country. In LaRock, the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited to Duro v. Reina ' for the proposition that the state may tax the income of a nonmember Indian residing within Indian Country. 5 The court also noted that "Congress responded to the Court's invitation by passing the 'Duro fix' which granted tribes criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians on tribal lands." ' This is only part of the Duro story.
In Duro, the United States Supreme Court found that the Salt River Tribe did not have criminal jurisdiction over a Mission Indian who killed a Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian on the Salt River Reservation." In response to the Supreme Court's holding in Duro, Congress adopted Public Law 102-137, commonly referred to as the "Duro fix." Citing United States v. Kagama, the United States House of Representatives noted that federal courts repeatedly hold that the term "Indian" includes any Indian in Indian Country, without regard to tribal membership.' The House of Representatives Conference Report noted:
[Tihe exception [to jurisdiction] is confined to those who by the usages and customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race. It does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally, of the family of Indians; and it intended to leave them both, as regarded their own tribe, and other tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages and customs."'
The legislative history of Public Law 102-137 indicates that Congress simultaneously recognized the multitribal nature of reservation populations and supported tribal jurisdiction, for both civil and criminal matters, over all Indians on reservations."' Reaffirming tribal governments' inherent" 82. Not all legal scholars agree that Congress had the ability to recognize inherent tribal sovereign authority when it enacted the "Duro fix":
Thus, we are presented with a legislative enactment purporting to recast history in a manner that alters the Supreme Court's stated understanding of the criminal jurisdiction over all Indians on their reservations, the United States Senate stated that congressional action:
[Is premised upon the reality and practice of reservation life: that non-tribal member Indians own homes and property on reservations, are part of the labor force on the reservation, and frequently are married to tribal members. Non-tribal member Indians receive the benefits of programs and services provided by the tribal government. Their children attend tribal schools, and their families receive health care services in tribal hospitals and clinics.... In addition, over the course of many years, Federal policy forced the relocation of many tribes onto one reservation." 3
Far from distinguishing between member and nonmember Indians, Congress acknowledged the extent which reservations are intertwined with Indians of various tribal origins. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this analysis, instead finding that "[a]lthough Congress granted 'Indian tribes' jurisdiction over Indians committing a crime on their tribal lands, it does not follow that Congress eliminated the distinction between Indian tribes. " " Congress retains plenary authority over Indian affairs." Consequently, Congress has the sole power to define a state's jurisdiction over Indian Country, Indian tribes, and individual Indians." Despite the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding to the contrary in LaRock, Congress's "Duro fix" not only overturned the United States Supreme Court's decision in Duro v. Reina, it also legislatively confirmed that there is no inherent state jurisdiction over nonmember Indians within Indian Country.
organizing principles by which the Indian tribes were incorporated into our constitutional system of government. The question we must address, then, is whether the amendment's authorization of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is, as Congress asserted, simply a non-substantive "recognition" of inherent rights that Indian tribes have always held or whether it constitutes an affirmative delegation of power. 
VI. Reversing the Presumption
Both Congress and the United States Supreme Court suffer from a lack of precision and specificity when defining the respective roles of states and tribes, especially in the area of Indian taxation. For example, in Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the ability of the Crow Indian Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by "nonmembers of the Tribe.' 7 Throughout its decision, the Supreme Court uses the term "nonmember" and "non-Indian" interchangeably. As the issue presented in Montana did not involve nonmember Indians, and the decision did not address nonmember Indians at all, it is unclear if the Court actually meant to draw this distinction. Congress is equally imprecise in the drafting of statutes ostensibly designed to protect tribal sovereignty." Perhaps in part due to this imprecision, the "canon of construction" for Indian law has evolved. The United States Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that it must be guided by "that eminently sound and vital canon ... that statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes... are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians."" 9 Courts must "avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power."" According to conventional wisdom, the essential point of the canons is to encourage narrow construction against invasions of Indian interests and broad construction favoring Indian rights. 9 '
The Wisconsin Supreme Court utilized the opposite analysis to reach its conclusion, noting that "LaRock has not cited any other federal law as having preempted the State from imposing income tax in such a situation."' The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not presume that the income of the Indian taxpayer was immune from taxation. Instead, the court examined the applicable treaties and federal laws to determine if they explicitly exempted the income of Ms. LaRock from taxation. 93 Such an analysis stands federal Indian tax law on its head. 
STATE INCOME TAXATION
Contrary to the holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in LaRock, there exists a presumption against the state's power to tax Indians or Indian property in Indian Country. State jurisdiction does not generally lie within reservation boundaries. The assertion of taxing authority is not excepted from this principle. 4 In order to overcome this presumption, the state must point to express congressional consent to tax Indians or their property in Indian Country. "This is so because ... Indians stand in a special relation to the federal government from which the states are excluded unless the Congress has manifested a clear purpose to terminate [a tax] immunity and allow states to treat Indians as part of the general community."" The tradition of Indian sovereignty requires that "the rule [of federal reluctance to interfere with state taxation] be reversed" when addressing the State's power to tax Indians or Indian property on reservations." "[T]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history. " ' Income earned from Indian Country is presumed to be beyond the state's taxing jurisdiction. The earning of income is substantially connected to the land, and is taxed based on the residence of the tax payer. This is what distinguishes taxation of income from sales taxation or transactions in personalty. In those cases that relate to an Indian deriving income from Indian Country, the tax is presumed impermissible unless specifically allowed by Congress:
However relevant the land-income distinction may be in other contexts, it is plainly irrelevant when, as here, the tax is resisted because the State is totally lacking in jurisdiction over both the people and the land it seeks to tax. In such a situation, the State has no more jurisdiction to reach income generated on reservation lands than to tax the land itself. 98 If the activity is substantially connected to Indian Country, the state is presumed not to have the ability to tax the activity unless Congress specifically grants such ability. "It is clear that the exemption accorded tribal and restricted Indian lands extends to the income derived directly therefrom."" The United States Supreme Court consistently draws a distinction between transactions based in personalty and those related to Indian income." In McClanahan, the State of Arizona attempted to impose a tax on the income of a Navajo Indian residing on the Navajo Reservation whose income was "wholly derived from reservation sources.".'.. The Supreme Court did not examine the source of Rosalind McClanahan's income to determine the existence of a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme regarding the source of her income. In fact, McClanahan fails to mention how Ms. McClanahan was employed in the years in question. The Court simply concluded that by imposing the tax in question on this appellant, the State had interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave to the exclusive province of the Federal Government and the Indians themselves. The tax is therefore unlawful as applied to reservation Indians with income derived wholly from reservation sources.
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The rule of McClanahan should also control when a nonmember Indian resides and derives her income from Indian Country. " In LaRoque v. State, the Supreme Court of Montana noted the importance of this "coalescence of situs (reservation) and status (Indian)."'' The LaRoque court found that Montana had no taxation jurisdiction over the income of an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe of 
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Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 466 (1976) (holding that in the absence of congressional consent the state was disabled from imposing a personal property tax on motor vehicles owned by Indians living in Indian Country, but could impose a tax on the sale of cigarettes to non-Indians); Bryan, 426 U.S. at 381 (holding that Public Law 280 did not grant the states the authority to tax "Indians or Indian property on reservations"). 
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The District Court of Montana clarified the meaning of non-Indian:
Defendants seek a clarification of the term "Non-Indian", contending that with respect to the sale of cigarettes on the Flathead Reservation anyone who is not an enrolled member of the plaintiff Tribes is a non-Indian. We do not agree. The cases and texts discussed supra refer generally to reservation Indians or Indians residing on the reservation. We conclude that all Indians residing on the Flathead Reservation are exempt from the payment of the cigarette tax. [Vol. 27
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North Dakota or an unenrolled Chippewa Indian of mixed heritage, stating that "tribal affiliation was unimportant as long as situs on a reservation and status as an Indian coalesced.""' The court went on to find that:
Since both appellants are Indians residing on the reservation, and since each of their incomes were derived wholly from reservation sources, their activity is "totally within the sphere which the relevant treaty and statutes leave for the Federal Government and for the Indians themselves." Therefore, we hold the State was without authority to impose its income tax on these Indian residents of an Indian reservation." 5
The Supreme Court of North Dakota made a similar finding in White Eagle v. Dorgan.H n For Indians that live and work in Indian Country, a state "is totally lacking in jurisdiction over the people and the lands it seeks to tax." ' ' In order to overcome the presumption that states are unable to tax an Indian in Indian Country, a state must show that Congress expressly provided for state taxation of the activity in question:"
In keeping with its plenary authority over Indian affairs, Congress can authorize the imposition of taxes on Indian tribes and individual Indians. It has not done so often, and the Court consistently has held that it will find the Indians' exemption from state taxes lifted only when Congress has made its intention to do so unmistakably clear."
Indians are not treated as part of the "general community" for taxation purposes. The state must show that Congress manifested a clear intent to terminate an Indian's tax immunity before a court may find that it has been so terminated:
[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing. . . Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan lays to rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent."' None of the Acts passed by Congress regarding the jurisdiction of the states over Indian Country specifically grant the power to tax the income of Indians residing in, and deriving their income from, Indian Country. If Congress is silent, the state has no jurisdiction to impose its tax.
One might be tempted to assume that a state tax on the income of an Indian in Indian Country has a substantial burden of proof to overcome. The combination of two presumptions, the "narrow construction in favor of Indian interest" presumption and the "presumption against state jurisdiction to tax," might seem at first glance to be an insurmountable obstacle to state taxation. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in LaRock illustrates, however, these presumptions are as useful as a left-handed spatula. On November 27, 2001, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Chickasaw Nation v. United States that tribal governments are not exempt from the federal pull-tab excise and occupation taxes."' The Chickasaw Nation argued that Congress, in passing the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,"' intended to treat tribal governments on par with state and local governments for purposes of federal gambling tax laws. The Supreme Court found that tribal governments are not entitled to exemption from federal excise taxes because the Internal Revenue Code contained what the Court found to be a "mistake."' The most telling point of the Court's discussion on this topic is its evaluation of the applicable canons of construction:
Moreover, the canon that assumes Congress intends its statutes to benefit the tribes is offset by the canon that warns us against interpreting federal statutes as providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly expressed. Nor can one say that the pro-Indian canon is inevitably stronger -particularly where the interpretation of a congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty is at issue. This Court's earlier cases are too individualized, involving too many different kinds of legal circumstances, to warrant any such assessment about the two canons' relative strength. nonmember Indians and non-Indians. The taxes concerned "transactions in personalty with no substantial connection to reservation lands."" The Supreme Court found Washington's taxes permissible, as they were "reasonably designed to prevent the Tribes from marketing their tax exemption to nonmembers who do not receive significant tribal services and who would otherwise purchase their cigarettes outside the reservations."'" The key to the Supreme Court's analysis in Colville was that the transaction involved the taxation of goods. The Court employed a balancing test of the state and tribe's interest in the activity in question, and found that the tribe did not have an interest in the imposition of a sales tax not substantially connected to the Indian Country in question.
The "categorical" approach enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chickasaw is the appropriate means by which a court should review a state's ability to tax an Indian's income. However, even if the White Mountain balancing test is utilized, the federal and tribal interests in the income of Indians living and working in Indian Country heavily outweigh any state interest in the same income. The federal government has an interest in promoting and regulating the employment of Indians in Indian Country and in keeping Indian families together. Indian tribes have an interest in the income of Indians, whether members or nonmembers, earned within Indian Country, as well as services 120 the tribe provides to those Indians. A state's only interest in the income of Indians earned in Indian Country is in taxing it. This is a case "in which the state has had nothing to do with the on-reservation activity, save tax it.' The federal government also strongly supports keeping Indian families together. In an effort to stop the removal of Indian children from their reservations and the break up of Indian families, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act."' The Wisconsin Supreme Court's failure to recognize the validity of a nonmember Indian's status as an Indian and encourage her presence on the reservation where her children are enrolled contradicts this effort to keep Indian families together.
A. Federal Interest in Nonmember Income
The federal government established a vast regulatory scheme both to promote Indian employment and to oversee those employed within Indian Country. Accordingly, the federal government has an interest in the employment of nonmember Indians and in their residence in Indian Country that outweighs any state interest in taxing income earned by nonmember Indians.
B. Tribal Interest in Nonmember Income
A tribe also has an interest in nonmembers that live and work in its Indian Country. Under treaties creating Indian Country, a tribe's interests include protecting and providing a home for all Indians within its borders. The jurisdiction of a tribe extends to all Indians within its borders, both members and nonmembers.' 32 Tribal powers extend "over both their members and their territory." ' 33 These powers can extend over members going beyond reservation boundaries, as well as individuals within those boundaries. Most tribes have laws that affect employment, including wage laws, employee incentive laws, conflict of interest laws, and whistle blower laws. Tribes also provide services to all Indians within their jurisdiction, whether members or nonmembers. Such services include trash pickup, public transit, food distribution, utility services, funeral expenses, public schooling, health services, travel monies for attending a funeral, and higher education reimbursement. The receipt of "significant tribal services" is an important consideration in balancing the interests of the state, the federal government, and the tribe.'" A tribe has a further interest in keeping its children with their Indian families. The Supreme Court recognized the overwhelming interest that an Indian tribe has in its children in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.' The Supreme Court implies in Holyfield that the correct angle from which a court should view ethnicity and the cultural ties of an Indian within Indian country is from the vantage point of the tribe's interests.
In LaRock, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that a nonmember Indian was subject to the State of Wisconsin's income tax, noting that "The fact is that LaRock -who is an enrolled member of the Menonminee The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals went on to find that the State of Idaho has no jurisdiction to tax the income of an Indian residing in and deriving such income from Indian Country, regardless of his tribal affiliation. This holding is now codified in the Idaho Tax Guidelines.
While it is true that nonmember Indians cannot vote in tribal elections, the same may be said of many tribal members. For instance, the Oneida Constitution does not allow tribal members to vote in elections until they are twenty-one years of age, yet they can be employed before this date. Despite being unable to participate in tribal elections, an eighteen-year-old Oneida Indian residing on the Oneida reservation and deriving her income from the Oneida reservation would not be subject to the State of Wisconsin's income taxation. The inability to vote does not grant the state the ability to tax. 
